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SHOULD THE COURT AID AND ABET THE
UNINTENDING ACCOMPLICE: THE STATUS OF
COMPLICITY IN CALIFORNIA
Catherine Carpenter*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On February 6, 1984, the California Supreme Court laid to rest
an issue that had plagued the California Court of Appeals for ten
years.' The supreme court in People v. Beeman2 decisively reversed
the conviction of Timothy Mark Beeman for aiding and abetting a
robbery, and in so doing, reshaped the law on accomplice liability in
California. Once a jurisdiction that marched to its own beat, California was now in step with the rest of the nation on the requirement of
intent for aider and abetter liability. 3 And with the advent of
Beeman, the accomplice it seems, has been propelled again into the
limelight."
1984 by Catherine Carpenter.
Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. The author
wishes to thank Joel Meskin, her research assistant, for his contribution to this article.
1. In 1974, the California Jury Instructions, Criminal No. 3.01 on aiding and abetting
was revised to delete the requirement of intentional aid or promotion of the commission of a
crime. CALJIC (4th rev. ed. 1979) No. 3.01. Numerous defendants have challenged the validity of convictions for crimes that they did not actually perpetrate, but merely aided and abetted.
See, e.g., In re Joe R., 27 Cal. 3d 496, 612 P.2d 927, 165 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1980); People v.
Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 3d 953, 544 P.2d 1335, 127 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1976); In re Jessie L., 131
Cal. App. 3d 202, 182 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1982); People v. Beeman, 126 Cal. App. 3d 749, 179
Cal. Rptr. 100 (1982); People v. Adams, 101 Cal. App. 3d 791, 162 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1980);
People v. Montano, 96 Cal. App. 3d 221, 158 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1979); People v. Yarber, 90 Cal.
App. 3d 895, 153 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1979); People v. Vernon, 89 Cal. App. 3d 853. 152 Cal.
Rptr. 765 (1979); People v. Mata, 85 Cal. App. 3d 233, 149 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1978); People v.
Soltero, 81 Cal. App. 3d 423, 146 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1978).
2. People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 547, 674 P.2d 1318, 199 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1984). He was
also convicted of burglary, false imprisonment, destruction of telephone equipment and assault
with intent to commit a felony.
3. As used in this article, an "aider and abettor" is a person who does not actually
perpetrate the crime, but aids in its commission either by advice, counsel, or encouragement
before or at the scene of the crime. The term "aider and abettor" will also be used interchangeably with the terms "accessory and accomplice". For an excellent discussion on this
topic, see Westerfield, The Mens Rea Requirement of Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law - Knowledge or Intent, 51 Miss. L.J. 155 (1980).
4. Recently, the United States Supreme Court had occasion to define the parameters of
accomplice liability under the U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. It states: "Excessive bail shall not be
©
*
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As Beeman indicates, the present controversy surrounds the acceptable minimal level of mens rea required for conviction of an accomplice. The Beeman decision reaffirmed the traditional common
law necessity of intent as the mens rea for accomplice liability.5 Jurisprudence has long recognized the importance and jealous regard of
intent in criminal law. 6 It should come as no surprise, then, that the
court would take this stand and continue historical protection.
This article explores the status of complicity cases following the
resurgence of intent. The first part tracks the historical basis for accomplice liability, from the early requirement of shared criminal intent to the acceptance of a standard requiring only knowing assistance. It concludes with the court's partial return to the traditional
role of intent in accessorial liability and demonstrates that the rejection of shared criminal intent in favor of knowing assistance was an
ineffectual policy attempt to redress certain conduct that was criminal but unreachable.
The second part of the article critically examines the intertwined relationship of conspiracy and complicity. The argument adrequired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." (emphasis added). In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), the Court declared unconstitutional a
death sentence for an accomplice who did not participate in the murder that had taken place
during a robbery. The felony murder, the Court found, could not provide the basis for imposing the death penalty "where a defendant did not take life, attempt to take it, or intend to take
." Id. at 793. See also Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197
life ...
Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983), where the California Supreme Court held that "the felony murder special circumstance of the 1978 [death penalty] initiative requires proof that defendant intended
to kill. Specifically, we construe the word 'intentionally' in subdivision (b) of [Penal Code]
section 190.2 to apply to all defendants-actual killers and accomplices alike-and to require
an intent to kill before a defendant is subject to a special circumstance finding under paragraph 17 of that section." Id. at 154, 1672 P.2d at 877, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
5. See Lord Mohun's case, 12 How. St. Tr. 949 (1692), where it was stated that if the
person present at the scene of the homicide "doth neither aid nor abet, nor anyways agree to
the doing of the thing [the killing] will neither be murder nor manslaughter . . . for if he
never engaged or agreed to the killing of him, nor was there for that purpose . . . he is
certainly not guilty. Also, in The Queen v. Coney, 8 Q.B.D. 534 (1882), Justice Hawkins
wrote: "[T]o constitute an aider and abettor some steps must be taken by word, or action, with
the intent to instigate the principal." Id. at 557. For a general discussion, see W. BLACKSTONE
COMMENTARIES 34-40 (11th ed. 1791). See also Sayre, Criminal Responsibilityfor the Acts of
Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1930).
6. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). In Morissette, the Supreme Court overturned defendant's conviction for theft under 18 U.S.C. § 641 because the
trial court had refused to allow defendant present the defense of mistake. The Supreme Court
found that the trial court concluded improperly that intent was not a required element of the
offense. See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). As recently as the 1984 term,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of conviction for murder where the
burden of proof was impermissibly shifted to defendant by jury instruction which allowed the
implication of malice and intent to be drawn from any deliberate and cruel act. See Koehler v.
Engle, 52 U.S.L.W. 4383 (1984).
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vanced is that the mens rea of knowledge continues to play a vital
role in accomplice liability. Analyzing the functional parallel of
knowledge in conspiracy cases will provide insight into assessing the
culpability of the aider and abettor.
Finally, the article explores the feasibility of legislative revision
in the form of a criminal facilitation statute. For ten years, the courts
of California posited the belief that knowing assistance was sufficient
for liability.' Underlying these opinions was the attempt to punish
unintending but knowing conduct that furthered criminal activity.
The desire to punish this type of conduct is meritorious, although the
method employed, the aider and abettor statute, was not the appropriate vehicle. Thus, the article concludes that the solution needed is
the enactment of a separate statute to punish the facilitator.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT

From a historical perspective, accomplice liability in California
has undergone major changes, both in substance and in form, in an
attempt to provide an effective framework for the conviction of accessories to a crime. The law has evolved from the common law position, which classified persons in a criminal transaction according to
their degree of involvement in the crime,' to the codification of parties under Penal Code sections 31' and 971,1 in which the distinc7. See supra note 1.
8. There were four categories of party liabilities at common law: principal in the first
degree, principal in the second degree, accessory before the fact, and, accessory after the fact. A
principal in the first degree was the primary actor who perpetrated the crime, while a principal in the second degree aided at the scene of the crime, his presence either actual or constructive. The accessory before the fact aided, encouraged, or promoted the crime but was not present at the scene. An accessory after the fact to the crime aided a felony after the perpetration
of the crime.
For a general discussion of party liability, see generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 63-66 (1972); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW
722-69 (3d ed. 1982); G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 8.5-8.8 (1978).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1970), which defines principals as:
All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or
misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense,
or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission, and all persons counseling, advising, or encouraging
children, under the age of fourteen years, lunatics or idiots, to commit any
crime, or who, by fraud, contrivance, or force, occasion the drunkenness of another for the purpose of causing him to commit any crime, or who, by threats,
menaces, commands, or coercion, compel another to commit ary crime, are principals in any crime so committed. (Enacted 1872.)
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 971 (West 1970) which states:
The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal, and between principals in the first and second degree is abrogated; and all persons
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tions among the parties have all but been eliminated.11 Borne out of
frustration with procedural technicalities that arose in the charging
and convicting of principals and accessories, the resulting changes
have circumvented some procedural obstacles experienced at common
law."
Nevertheless, the controversial nature of the accomplice continued to plague the courts, amid confusion on the appropriate standard
for the mens rea required of an accomplice. Unlike some jurisdictions, California did not have the benefit of a specific legislative enactment addressing the state of mind necessary for conviction as an
accomplice. 3 The result has been a patchwork of inconsistent application of the common law terminology of criminal intent, 4 but with
concerned in the commission of a crime, who by the operation of other provisions of this code are principals therein, shall hereafter be prosecuted, tried and
punished as principals and no other facts need be alleged in any accusatory
pleadings against any such person than are required in an accusatory pleading
against a principal.
11. An accessory after the fact was the only party not to merge under CAL. PENAL
CODE § 31 (West 1970). See CAL. PENAL CODE §32 (West 1970), which defined and maintained the common law classification.
12. Under the common law provisions, the courts often faced insurmountable obstacles
relating to issues of jurisdiction and the convictions and sentencings of secondary parties. The
jurisdiction over the principal was predicated on the commission of the crime, but the accessory
was charged in the jurisdiction in which he gave aid or counsel, resulting in conflicting legal
requirements of proof and conviction. By far the most difficult of the common law rules, was
the requirement that the principal must be convicted prior to the accessory. If for any reason
the principal should have evaded trial, or been acquitted, the accessory could not be punished.
For an excellent view of the common law approach, see Perkins, Parties to Crime, 89 U. PA.
L. REV. 581 (1941).
13. Several states require that a defendant charged as an aider and abettor to a crime,
and therefore liable as a principal, must entertain the requisite intent for that crime. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STATE. ANN. § 53a-8 (West 1972) (an individual must act with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense to be an aider or abettor prosecuted and punished as
a principal); see State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 513, 447 A.2d 396 (1982) (the accessory statute,
§ 53a-8, requires that an aider and abettor have the intent to aid and the intent to commit the
offense with which he is charged); see also State v. Haskins, 188 Conn. 432, 450 A.2d 828
(1982); see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 1975) (statute requires that for an individual to be liable as an aider and abettor he must act with the mental culpability required for
the commission of the crime charged); see also People v. Reyes, 82 A.D.2d 925, 440 N.Y.S.2d
674 (1981) (the Court found that there was insufficient evidence of the defendant's mental
culpability to commit the crime, and therefore he could not be convicted as a principal for
aiding the perpetrator); see also People v. Green, 80 A.D.2d 693, 436 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1981);
see generally TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02 (Vernon 1974) (subsection (a)(1), which requires that for a person to be liable for an offense committed by another, he must act with the
kind of culpability required for the offense).
14. For a general discussion, see W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW, § 64 (1972). See also Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442 (1893); State v. Taylor, 70
Vt. 1, 39 A. 447 (1898); People v. Molano, 253 Cal. App. 2d 841, 61 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1967).
While it is true that the common law cases focused extensively on the party's conduct to mark
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a modification that came about recently-the inclusion of the mens
rea of knowing assistance.
During this period, the case law was best exemplified by People
v. Dole, 5 in which the California Supreme Court emphasized that
the accomplice's conduct must "not only be consistent with guilt, it
must also be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence."' 6 In that case, the court required that Dole, in handling the
forged check, demonstrate his guilty intent or knowledge that such
check would be used to defraud the loan company.17 Although the
language of knowledge was used, it was of critical importance in the
Dole line of cases that the accomplice intended to encourage the commission of the crime. 8 The critical factor in some of the early California cases was also whether defendant's conduct demonstrated that
his degree of culpability, the cases were replete with references to the accomplice's criminal
intent.
15. 122 Cal. 486, 55 P. 581 (1898).
16. Id. at 495, 55 P. at 585.
17. Id. at 492-93, 55 P. at 584. Subsequent courts reiterated the language used in Dole,
describing the requisite for conviction as either intent or knowledge. See People v. Warren, 130
Cal. 683, 63 P. 86 (1900) (citing Dole as authority for the requirement that a person accused
of stealing cows under an aider and abettor theory must have a distinct and conscious assertion
of possession to be convicted under that theory); People v. Morine, 138 Cal. 626, 72 P. 166
(1903) (court claimed that appellant's intent was clear under the facts, thus the evidence was
sufficient to render a manslaughter conviction under an aider and abettor theory); People v.
Yee, 37 Cal. App. 579, 174 P. 343 (1918) (to be convicted as an aider and abettor, an individual must criminally or with guilty knowledge and intent, aid the actual perpetrator of the act);
People v. Fredoni, 12 Cal. App. 685, 108 P. 663 (1910).
It is clear, however, from an examination of these cases, that the secondary parties exhibited far more than knowing assistance in the facilitation of the crimes. In fact, these cases
reflect that the accomplices, by words or conduct, shared the criminal intent of the primary
party. See People v. Warren, 130 Cal. 683, 63 P. 86 (1900) (accused required to have a
distinct and conscious assertion of possession to be convicted as an aider and abettor); see also
People v. Lewis, 9 Cal. App. 279, 98 P. 1078 (1908) (even though the appellant was not
present during the acts charged, there was sufficient evidence that he aided the perpetrator
with the guilty knowledge and felonious intent to be convicted as a principal); People v.
Fisher, 30 Cal. App. 135, 157 P. 7 (1916) (the court claimed that appellant must have the
specific intent to kidnap the victim in order to be convicted as an aider and abettor on a
kidnapping charge).
18. Conduct that objectively demonstrates the accomplice's intent to contribute, encourage, or promote a target offense as proof of liability gained much critical and legal support
in the federal decision of United States v. Peoni, 100 F. 2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938). Judge Learned
Hand framed the issue of defendant's guilt by whether it could be proven that Peoni had
encouraged the further sale of the counterfeit bills from his buyer, Dorsey, to a third party.
The court concluded that defendant lacked the purposive attitude necessary to hold him liable
as an aider.and abettor of counterfeit bills. Id. at 402-03. For a contrary result, see Backun v.
United States, 112 F. 2d 635 (4th Cir. 1940). Judge Parker determined, in contrast to Judge
Hand's view on the required culpability of an accomplice, that the aider's knowledge that
assistance will help in the commission of the felony, here transporting stolen merchandise, was
sufficient for conviction.
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he intended to encourage the illegal activity.19
A.

The Emergence of Knowledge

Without clear cut parameters of mens rea in accomplice liability, a schism developed in the later case law. On one side, courts
maintained the common law precept that the conviction of an accom20
plice required an intent to aid the perpetrator of the crime. On the
other side, the courts posited the view that intent was not required
for conviction and, without regard to the necessity of purposive con"
duct, required only knowing assistance by the secondary party.
The dichotomy in views stemmed in part from the interpretation of ambiguous language contained in the supreme court decision
of People v. Terry.2 2 In that case, defendants were charged with the
shooting deaths of two people during the course of robberies. An instruction was refused by the trial court that would have required for
conviction a finding that the accomplice, Juanilda, had the specific
intent to rob.23 The court, in affirming the conviction, without the
use of that instruction, stated that Juanilda "could be an aider and
abettor without ever forming the intent to take any money or other
property. .

.

. She was an aider and abettor if, with knowledge of

promoted, or assisted in
Terry's criminal purpose, she 2encouraged,
4
the commission of the crimes."

At the time of the Terry decision, the pertinent California jury
instruction on accomplice liability read: "A person aids and abets the
commission of a crime if he knowingly and with criminal intent
19. See People v. Durham, 70 Cal. 2d 171, 449 P.2d 198, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1969).
20. See generally People v. Francis, 71 Cal. 2d 66, 72, 450 P.2d 591, 595, 75 Cal. Rptr.
199, 203 (1969); People v. Bohmer, 46 Cal. App. 3d 185, 199, 120 Cal. Rptr. 136, 145
(1975); People v. Doptis, 176 Cal. App. 2d 738, 742, 81 Cal. Rptr. 314, 316 (1969); People v.
Butts, 236 Cal. App. 2d 817, 836, 46 Cal. Rptr. 362, 374 (1965); Pinell v. Superior Court,
232 Cal. App. 2d 284, 287, 42 Cal. Rptr. 676, 678 (1965).
21. See generally People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 401, 466 P.2d 961, 986, 85 Cal. Rptr.
409, 434 (1970); People v. Ott, 84 Cal. App. 3d 118, 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. 479, 487 (1978);
People v. Standifer, 38 Cal. App. 3d 733, 744, 113 Cal. Rptr. 653, 660 (1974); People v.
Scofield, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 1026, 95 Cal. Rptr. 405, 410 (1971); People v. Belenger, 222
Cal. App. 2d 159, 163, 34 Cal. Rptr. 918, 920 (1963); People v. Ellhamer, 199 Cal. App. 2d
777, 782, 18 Cal. Rptr. 905, 909 (1962).
22. 2 Cal. 3d 362, 466 P.2d 961, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1970). See People v. Beeman, 35
Cal. 3d 547, 557-60, 674 P.2d 1318, 1323-25, 199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 65-67 (1984) for an explanation of the Terry decision.
23. People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 401, 466 P.2d 961, 986, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 434
(1970).
24. Id. See also People v. Holford, 63 Cal. 2d 74, 81, 403 P.2d 423, 427, 45 Cal. Rptr.
167, 171 (1965); People v. Belenger, 222 Cal. App. 2d 159, 163, 34 Cal. Rptr. 918, 920
(1963).
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aids, promotes . . . the commission of such crime." '2 5 In response to
Terry and its progeny, the instruction was modified in 1974 to read:
"A person aids and abets the commission of a crime if, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime, he
aids, promotes . . .the commission of such crime." 26 This change

enabled a jury to convict upon an offer of proof of knowledge without any requirement of a showing of criminal intent on the part of
the accomplice. The altered instruction gave rise to subsequent challenges that without the necessity of intent the instruction created
prejudicial error in its statement of the law on accomplice liability.
Following Terry, a line of cases emerged defending the changed jury
instruction.
In People v. Ott," defendant had been convicted of aiding and
abetting a drug sale and had appealed claiming that the jury had
been improperly instructed on the issue of culpability. Defendant
contended that California courts, supported by earlier case law, traditionally required more than knowing assistance to satisfy the mens
rea for aiding and abetting.28 The court upheld the conviction, however, and reaffirmed the validity of newly revised CALJIC instruction on aiding and abetting. It based its decision on two separate
points, both of which will be explored.
First, the Ott court concluded that the concept of shared criminal intent referred to by prior courts was in fact only the need that
the perpetrator and the accomplice share in the knowledge that the
perpetrator would commit a crime. 9 This argument becomes problematic when the cases cited by the Ott court are examined. Although the cases cited with approval by those opinions did involve
instances of assistance, they also supported the finding of purposive
conduct to demonstrate intent.3"
25. THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, SUPERIOR
COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL 3.01 (former instruction) (3d rev. ed. 1970). See People v. Vasquez, 29 Cal. App. 3d 81,

84, 105 Cal. Rptr. 181, 183 (1972).
26. 1 THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARD

JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, SUPERIOR
COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL 3.01 (4th rev. ed 1979) (emphasis added).

27. 84 Cal. App. 3d 118, 148 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1978).
28. Id. at 129, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
29. Id. at 129, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 486. See also People v. Tambini, 275 Cal. App. 2d
757, 765, 80 Cal. Rptr. 179, 184 (1969); People v. Ellhamer, 199 Cal. App. 2d 777, 781-82,
18 Cal. Rptr. 905, 908 (1962).
30. See People v. Butts, 236 Cal. App. 2d 817, 836, 46 Cal. Rptr. 362, 374 (1965)
(evidence showed defendant's active participation in a fist fight even though he was not aware
of the instrumentality causing the homicide); People v. Villa, 156 Cal. App. 2d 128, 134, 318
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Secondly, the court found that knowledge of the wrongful purpose of the perpetrator "eo ipso establishes criminal intent."" a The
court emphasized that "[a]lthough the guilt of the aider and abettor
is dependent upon the actor's crime, the criminal intent of the aider
and abettor is presumed from his actions with knowledge of the actor's wrongful purpose." 2 This argument restates an obvious but
critical point-in most cases an inference can be drawn from an accomplice's knowing assistance that the accomplice intended to aid the
commission of a crime.
In positing this theory, the court oversimplifies the offer of
proof required in a criminal case. There is a vast difference between
using knowledge as a basis to infer intent and in deciding that the
jury need only consider the issue of knowledge without regard to
intent. Thus, if intent is presumed from knowledge, the ultimate factual basis issue in Ott-the intent to aid in the drug sale-was taken
from the jury. In comparison, a jury instructed under the former
CALJIC 3.01"3 would have had to determine that Ott knowingly
and with criminal intent aided in the drug sale. Under such an instruction, evidence of knowledge may be introduced to infer the intent to aid, but the ultimate resolution would remain a finding of
criminal intent. More importantly, under the Ott rationale, evidence
reasonably dispelling the inference of criminal intent would not necessarily negate the presumed mens rea.8 4
B.

The Yarber Confrontation

The struggle in the appellate courts illustrated above over
whether knowing assistance or intent to contribute should be the required mens rea culminated in the case of People v. Yarber, 5 which
responded to the generalizations asserted in Ott. Yarber presented a
situation that was factually bizarre yet significant because of Bonnie
Yarber's successful challenge of the jury instructions.
P.2d 828, 833 (1957) (court found that the defendant did not actually assist in the altercation,
but he stood by ready to fight if necessary).
31. People v. Ott, 84 Cal. App. 3d 118, 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. 479, 486 (1978).
32. 84 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 487 (quoting People v. Ellhamer, 199
Cal. App. 2d at 782, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 908 (1962)).
33. See People v. Durham, 70 Cal. 2d 171, 449 P.2d 198, 74 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1969).
34. The idea that knowledge eo ipso establishes criminal intent was discussed in People
v. Flores, 128 Cal. App. 3d 512, 525-526, 180 Cal. Rptr. 368, 375 (1982); People v. Standifer,
38 Cal. App. 3d 733, 743-44, 113 Cal. Rptr. 653, 660 (1974); People v. Belenger, 222 Cal.
App. 2d 159, 163, 34 Cal. Rptr. 918, 920 (1963); and People v. Ellhamer, 199 Cal. App. 2d
777, 782, 18 Cal. Rptr. 905, 908 (1962).
35. 90 Cal. App. 3d 895, 153 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1979).
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The Yarbers were charged with many sexual offenses involving
several teenage girls. The husband, Wendol, was convicted of eighteen counts of oral copulation with minors, and his wife Bonnie was
convicted of aiding and abetting the copulation of Wendol on June
17th. The evidence most damning came from one of the teenagers,
Mary S., who testified that on June 17th Bonnie orally copulated
her husband while the girls watched and that they followed her actions.36 It was acknowledged that at no time on the 17th did Bonnie
ask the girls to copulate Wendol, although there was evidence to indicate that she had made the requests on June 14th, several days
previously.37 Because the charge against Bonnie specified June 17th,
the prosecution conceded that her conviction could not rest solely on
her acts of June 14th.
Two possible inferences could be drawn from Bonnie Yarber's
act of copulation-either she orally copulated her husband with the
purpose of encouraging the girls to do the same, or she copulated
him without any intent to contribute to the commission of the crime
that followed, but with the knowledge that this action might occur.
With these inferences in mind, it is clear that the offered jury instruction on aiding and abetting were critical to the outcome of the
case.
The court of appeals reversed Bonnie Yarber's conviction on the
basis that the jury instruction given created prejudicial error. It rejected the Ott premise that: (1) knowledge alone is sufficient for conviction, and (2) if intent is required, knowledge presumes its existence.3 8 Noting that knowledge could support an inference that
criminal intent existed, the court stressed its importance at trial.
Nevertheless, the court maintained that the jury instruction must reflect that intent demonstrated by the accomplice was the ultimate fact
to be proved. As Justice Feinberg wrote:
The Elhamer/Ott synthesis that intent is inferred from the
knowledge by the aider and abettor of the perpetrator's purpose
is sound, generally, as a matter of human experience, but we
cannot extrapolate therefrom, as a matter of law, that the infer36. Id. at 900, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 877. As the court indicated in its footnote, even this
testimony was suspect since Mary S. expressed doubts on cross examination about her recollection. Testimony by two other girls conflicted with Mary's statement. Id. at 900 n.1, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 876 n.l.
37. This acknowledgement came at the appellate level when the Attorney General conceded that the District Attorney misstated the facts in closing argument. The request made by
Bonnie occurred on June 14. Id. at 900 n.2, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 876-77 n.2.
38. Id. at 909-17, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 882-87.
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ence must be drawn. Intent is what must be proved; from a
person's action with knowledge of the purpose of the perpetrator of a crime, his intent to aid the perpetrator can be inferred. . . . But where a contrary inference is reasona-

ble-where there is room for doubt that a person intended to
aid a perpetrator-his knowledge of the perpetrator's purpose
will not suffice.8 9
Since the current jury instructions, in effect, took the issue from the
jury, the court concluded that there was prejudicial error.
The Yarber court then proffered language of its own to remedy
what it perceived as a defective instruction. Under its provision, the
jury would be instructed that: "a person aids and abets the commission of a crime if, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, he intentionally aids, promotes, encourages or instigates
by act or advice the commission of such crime. '"40 The court found
that the instruction given in Bonnie's case was prejudicial because
the jury may have found Bonnie guilty simply because she had
knowledge that her act would precipitate similar conduct from the
girls, without a finding that she had the mens rea to intentionally aid
in that goal.
Although the Yarber decision may present sound legal analysis,
the justification used does not appear to fit the particular facts of the
case. If we examine the case law supporting shared criminal intent,
it seems clear that common to those cases is the acknowledgement
that knowledge coupled with purposive conduct supports a conviction. It could be argued that Bonnie Yarber's conduct supported the
inference that she knew that in copulating her husband the girls
would engage in similar conduct. The facts show that Bonnie's conduct, if viewed over the course of the three days, demonstrated a
purposive attitude to involve the girls in the copulation of her husband.4 1 Under this analysis, the jury's finding here was rationally
supported by the facts of the case. At the worst, the refusal of the
39. Id. at 916, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87. The court sets out several situations in which a
contrary inference might be raised at trial. For example, the existence of a state of mind, such
as mistake, would negate intent. Also, the facts of People v. Valenzuela, 130 Cal. App. 3d 903,
907-09, 182 Cal. Rptr. 160, 162-64 (1982), hearing granted, June 16, 1982, suggests a factual pattern illustrative of the concern expressed by the court. In Valenzuela, defendant physically aided the commission of a robbery, but her state of mind was such as to negate the intent
to commit the robbery. See also infra note 61 and accompanying text.
40. People v. Yarber, 90 Cal. App. 3d 895, 916, 153 Cal. Rptr. 875, 887 (1979).
41. According to Mary S., Bonnie asked her to copulate Wendol on the 14th of June.
Other evidence indicates that Bonnie and Wendol showed X-rated movies to the girls and
performed sexual acts in front of them. Id. at 899, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
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jury instruction may have involved a case of harmless error which
did not dictate a reversal.4
Assuming that the jury decided the case solely on the basis of
Bonnie Yarber's having exhibited knowledge, the opinion offers
sound guidelines on the issue of accomplice liability. Ironically,
Yarber herself may not represent the classic accomplice that the
court addressed. After all, in reviewing the examples that Justice
Feinberg offered to support his theory, Bonnie Yarber does not seem
to fit the role of facilitator whose state of mind is negated by mistake
or other innocent-type mens rea.
As Justice Scott stated in the dissent:
[T]he facts of this particular case indicate that a contrary inference is not reasonable and that a shared criminal intent is indisputably indicated. .

. The entire behavior of Bonnie Sue and

Wendol indicates that they were acting as a unit, up to and
including June 17, in their attempts to involve the children in
their sexual activity.43
The majority attempted to require more than mere knowledge
of the wrongfulness of the perpetrator's conduct; yet, it would appear
that Bonnie had demonstrated the type of purposive conduct from
which a jury could find the requisite intent.
One could surmise, then, that the Yarber court was less concerned with the particular facts of Yarber than with remedying a
perceived flaw in the law on accomplice liability.44 In that context, it
did serve as a catalyst for the ultimate review of the topic by the
California Supreme Court in People v. Beeman.45 Beeman, however,
was not without factual peculiarities. Beeman's sister-in-law was
robbed by two men who were close friends of defendant Beeman. At
trial, both men testified against Beeman disputing his claim that he
had not been involved in the robbery. They testified that Beeman
42. Under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), reversal of a conviction based
upon instructional error is not required if the evidence overwhelmingly establishes guilt. But
see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (Supreme Court unanimously reversed because of a defective jury instruction).
43. People v. Yarber, 90 Cal. App. 3d 895, 917-18, 153 Cal. Rptr. 875, 887-88 (1979)
(Scott, J., dissenting). In his note, J. Scott indicated that the reason the State Public Defender
did not raise the issue of instructional error initially was because "the error [did] not exist."
Id. at 918, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 888.
44. The State Public Defender did not raise the issue of aiding and abetting on appeal;
rather, the parties briefed the issues on the court's suggestion. Id. at 918 footnote, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 888 footnote (Scott, J., dissenting). This may indicate that the court, already concerned with the guidelines of accomplice liability, seized this opportunity to attack the Ott
reasoning.
45. 35 Cal. 3d 547, 674 P.2d 1318, 199 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1984).
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had encouraged the commission of the crimes by drawing a layout of
the home, giving helpful suggestions on carrying out the robbery,
and offering to sell the "loot. ' ' 4" Beeman defended these claims by

admitting that he may have made the gestures indicated, but that
they were made without the criminal intent that the state had
implied.47
On the charge of aiding and abetting the robbery, the trial court
instructed the jury: "A person aids and abets the commission of a
crime, if, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator
of the crime, he aids, promotes, encourages or instigates by acts or
advice the commission of such crime."" 8 Beeman was convicted of the
crimes; his appeal rested in large measure on the alleged instructional error given by the court that he could be found guilty of the
robbery without intending to aid and abet its commission.4 9
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court had stated
correct
law on aiding and abetting; it based the decision on two
the
principles. The court found that the prior case law was well settled
and that it supported a finding of knowledge as the mens rea for
accomplice liability."' Further, the court concluded that the policies
surrounding aiding and abetting were best served by the requirement
of volitional aid when coupled with guilty knowledge, rather than
intentional aid."'
In what can only be labelled the "Terry misunderstanding," the
supreme court reviewed the law on aiding and abetting and con35 Cal. 3d at 551-52, 674 P.2d at 1320, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
Id. at 562, 674 P.2d at 1327, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 69. The mens rea for robbery under
CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1970) is the felonious intent that accompanies the taking. The
intent must be to permanently deprive the owner of his property. See People v. Butler, 65 Cal.
2d 569, 421 P.2d 703, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1967), for a discussion of the animus furandi
required in robbery where defendant claimed a bona fide belief to claim money owing him
through violence. To negate intent, Beeman attempted to characterize all his conduct as innocent. For example, in explaining his possession of some of the stolen jewelry, Beeman told the
court that he had devised a plan so that the robbers would have to relinquish control over some
of the stolen items. He stated that he did this in order to ultimately collect and return all of the
stolen property. 35 Cal. 3d at 553, 674 P.2d at 1321, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
48. 35 Cal. 3d at 554-55, 674 P.2d at 1321-22, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 63-64 (citing CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL No. 3.01 (4th rev. ed. 1979)).
49. See id. at 554, 674 P.2d at 1321, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
50. People v. Beeman, 179 Cal. Rptr. 100, 105-09 (Cal. App. 1981) (opinion omitted on
direction of the supreme court by order dated Feb. 10, 1982). The two cases cited with approval by the appellate court and discussed in greater detail infra are People v. Terry, 2 Cal.
3d 362, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961 (1970), and People v. Standifer, 38 Cal. App. 3d
733, 113 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1974). Both cases have been credited with the ensuing revision in the
California Jury Instruction Criminal § 3.01 that occurred in 1974.
51. People v. Beeman, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
46.
47.
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cluded that "[t]here is no question that an aider and abettor must
have criminal intent in order to be convicted of a criminal offense." '52
This statement is remarkable because the supreme court had previously stated in People v. Terry,53 "[T]he test is did the defendant aid
and abet the perpetrator with knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal intent?" 4
Rather than overrule Terry, the supreme court deftly backpeddled its way out of a difficult position. It rejected the Attorney General's argument that Terry sanctioned, and even required, the reasoning established in the Ott case. 5" The court clarified that an
accomplice need not specifically intend to commit the crime, but that
he must intend to aid the perpetrator's commission of the crime. 6
With this statement, the court shed light on its oft-quoted sentence
from Terry that "[o]ne who aids and abets does not necessarily have
the intention of enjoying the fruits of the crime." 5
While Beeman spurned the sole use of knowledge to convict, it
did not adopt the view espoused by other states which requires that
the aider and abettor have the same intent as the perpetrator. 58
Beeman adopted, instead, a modified version of "shared criminal intent." In a case of robbery, for example, other states require that the
aider and abettor have the intent to permanently deprive the owner
of its property.5 9 According to the California Supreme Court, however, the aider shares in the criminal intent if the aider "knows the
52. 35 Cal. 3d at 556, 674 P.2d at 1323, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 65. The court cited to People
v. Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 3d 953, 544 P.2d 1335, 127 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1976), and to CAL. PENAL
CODE § 20 (West 1970).
53. 2 Cal. 3d 362, 466 P.2d 961, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1970).
54. People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d at 557, 674 P.2d at 1324, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 66 (citing
People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 401, 466 P.2d 961, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1970)). One can see
why Terry is credited with the change in the California Jury instruction § 3.01-the language
of Terry was taken verbatim.

55. Lest one gets the impression that only the Attorney General believed that Terry
stood for this proposition, it should be noted that most courts of appeals following 1970 also
interpreted Terry to mean that intent was not required. See People v. Green, 130 Cal. App.
3d, 181 Cal Rptr. 507 (1982); People v. Valenzuela, 130 Cal. App. 3d 903, 182 Cal. Rptr.
160 (1982); People v. Beeman, 179 Cal Rptr. 100 (Cal. App. 1981) (opinion omitted on direction of the supreme court by order dated Feb. 10, 1982); People v. Yarber, 90 Cal. App. 3d

895, 153 Cal Rptr. 875 (1979); People v. Ott, 84 Cal. App. 3d 118, 148 Cal. Rptr. 479
(1978); People v. Standifer, 38 Cal. App. 3d 733, 113 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1974); People v. Ellhamer, 199 Cal. App. 2d 777, 18 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1962). For a contrary interpretation, see
People v. Grant, 113 Cal. App. 3d 432, 179 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1980) (in which the court deter-

mined that Ott and Standifer had incorrectly applied Terry).
56. People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d at 560, 674 P.2d at 1326, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
57.

Id. (citing People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d at 401).

58.
59.

Id. at 562, 674 P.2d at 1327, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 69. See also note 47.
Id.
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full extent of the perpetrator's criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator's commission of the crime. '"60

From the above analysis, it appears that the court has adopted a
position between the polarized stands of the Ott court and the common law. In light of this standard, how will the courts interpret future cases? Consider, for example, the problem developed in People
v. Valenzuela6 1 in which the defendant helped another to commit
the actus reus of the crime of robbery by taking a television set.
Valenzuela's defense at trial on a charge of aiding and abetting robbery was that she did not intend to permanently deprive the owner
of the set, but rather that she was motivated by a desire to diffuse a
potentially violent situation.
Under a Beeman analysis, did defendant share in the criminal
intent even though the evidence may suggest that her sole motivation
was to get her friend out of the house before any violence erupted? It
could be argued that the California Supreme Court would not endorse a defense to accomplice liability because Valenzuela did in fact
give aid by carrying out the television set. Further, she did this act
with an intent to facilitate the robbery, although motivated by a different desire than the intent to commit the theft. An argument that
advances Valenzuela's position would only have merit if "shared
criminal intent" requires that she entertained the underlying mens
rea for robbery. Because in Beeman the supreme court expressly refuted this point,6" it appears that she would be convicted. Thus,
Beeman may be viewed as an intermediate position between the requirements of knowledge and intent.
While Beeman embraced the reasoning of Yarber that intent as
the ultimate issue of proof cannot be presumed, the court rejected the
exact instruction offered by the court of appeals.6" Instead, it advanced wording that it believed would be unambiguous. The new
language suggested was: "A person aids and abets the commission of
a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of commit60. Id. at 560, 674 P.2d at 1326, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
61. 130 Cal. App. 903, 907-09, 182 Cal. Rptr. 160, 162-64 (1982), hearing granted,
June 16, 1982.
62. People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d at 559, 674 P.2d at 1325, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
63. The Yarber instruction stated that "[a] person aids and abets the commission of a
crime, if, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, he intentionally aids,
promotes, encourages, or instigates by act or advice the commission of such crime." People v.
Yarber, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 916, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 887.

1984]

ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY

ting, encouraging or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by
acts or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commis64
sion of the crime."
The dissent by Justice Richardson emphasized the point mentioned above that if there was a failure to give a proper jury instruction in this case, it was not prejudicial error.6 5 He reiterated the
view expressed by the Beeman court of appeals that "the verdicts
clearly demonstrated that the jury disbelieved the testimony of appellant which would have supported a finding that he did not have the
requisite criminal intent."' 66 As the dissent implies, the Beeman facts
may not have provided the best vehicle with which to overturn established law.67
The supreme court in Beeman appeared to answer decisively
the question of intent in accomplice liability, but two questions remain unresolved. The first concerns the role that the mens rea of
knowledge will play following Beeman. The second concerns the
court's failure to address the problem of the criminal facilitator, conduct that would be criminal under the Ott standard, and which
should continue to be punished.

III.

THE PARAMETERS OF KNOWLEDGE

Despite the requirement of intent affirmed in Beeman, the mens
rea of knowledge will continue to play a vital role in determining
liability. As the Beeman court stated: "[P]roof of the aider and abettor's intent may be made by way of an inference from her volitional
acts with knowledge of their probable consequences."68
To evaluate the parameters of knowledge in accomplice liability, it is useful to examine the crime of conspiracy which also uses
knowledge to establish the mens rea. At one level, although conspiracy and complicity address different societal dangers, both doctrines
sufficiently overlap to punish group behavior. It may be beneficial,
then, to create a uniform mens rea to punish group conduct.69
64.

People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d at 561, 674 P.2d at 1326, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 68.

65. Id. at 563, 674 P.2d at 1328, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
66. Id. For cases that have determined that the failure to give a Yarber-type jury instruction was not prejudicial, see People v. Fagalito, 123 Cal. App. 3d 524, 176 Cal. Rptr. 698
(1981); People v. Lopez, 116 Cal. App. 3d 882, 172 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1981); People v. Grant,
113 Cal. App. 3d 432, 170 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1980).

67. Not coincidentally, the same battle cry was made by the Yarber dissent when the
majority overturned the conviction before the court. People v. Yarber, 90 Cal. App. 3d 895,
917-18, 153 Cal. Rptr. 875, 887-88 (1979) (Scott, J., dissenting).
68. People v. Beeman, 35 Cal. 3d 559-60, 674 P.2d at 1325, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
69.

As Justice Hand stated in United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
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Conspiracy recognizes that group criminal activity poses an
added threat to society. To that end, it attempts to deter conduct at a
very early stage in the criminal transaction. ° In addition to its role
as an inchoate crime, however, 7 conspiracy also serves to punish
those actors who do not actually commit the target offenses, but who,
nonetheless, contemplate their commissions. 72' There are two such
categories of liability: (1) the prosecution for the substantive offense
intended by the agreement, and (2) the prosecution for offenses
deemed to be within the scope of the conspiracy, but not necessarily
intended."
In the typical conspiracy case, proving the conspirator's intent
poses no unusual challenge for the prosecution because the conspirator has demonstrated clearly his involvement in the partnership. His
lack of presence at the scene of the crime will not negate his mani1940), affd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940), "the first question is whether the seller of goods, in themselves innocent, becomes a conspirator with-or, what is in substance the same thing, an abettor of the buyer because he knows that the buyer means to use the goods to commit a crime."
70. The crime of conspiracy is defined in California as "two or more persons who conspire to commit any crime." CAL. PENAL CODE § 182 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983) (emphasis
added). As elaborated upon in People v. Fujita, 43 Cal. App. 3d 454, 471, 117 Cal. Rptr. 757,
767, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1974), a criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or
more persons that they will commit an unlawful act or achieve a lawful object by unlawful
means. Id. See Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 93335 (1959). See also Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961). One could analogize the
role of the conspirator at the planning stage with an accessory-before-the-fact at common law.
A major distinction would be the need to tie the accessory-before-the-fact to the attempted or
completed target offense.
71. The controversy over extending the scope of liability to pre-attempt activities is beyond the bounds of this paper. For a criticism of conspiracy as an inchoate offense, see Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1137 (1973). To avoid punishing actors for what appears to be their thoughts alone, some states have required, additionally,
an overt act that manifests their group intent. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 184 (West 1970
& Supp. 1983), which states: "No agreement amounts to a conspiracy, unless some act, beside
such agreement, be done within this state to effect the object thereof, by one or more of the
parties to such agreement . ... "

72. The most celebrated case in this regard is Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640
(1946), wherein two brothers were convicted of conspiracy and violations of the Internal Revenue Code. It was no defense to Daniel that he was sitting in prison on another charge while
Walter was committing the crimes. See also People v. Ramiro, 89 Cal. App. 3d 809, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1979); People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452, 229 P. 40 (1924) (court concluded that it was
not necessary that two persons should meet together and enter into an explicit formal agreement to commit the crime). Id. at 484, 229 P. at 53.
73. See, e.g., In re Darrell Anthony T., 90 Cal. App 3d 325, 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. 261,
265 (1979) (the court held defendant liable, as a member of a conspiracy to assault a person,
for all actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy). This position is also firmly established
in accomplice liability. See People v. Martinez, 239 Cal. App. 2d 161, 48 Cal. Rptr. 521
(1966) (court held that defendant was guilty of the consequences of his brother's conduct
which he knowingly aided and abetted); People v. Goldstein, 146 Cal. App. 2d 268, 303 P.2d
892 (1956).
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fested intent to commit the crime.74 Similarly, in most aiding and
abetting cases there is no problem of proof. Like the conspirator, the
aider and abettor has clearly made his shared criminal intent
75
apparent.
In some cases, however, courts have experienced difficulties in
determining conspiratorial liability when there has been no affirmative assertion of specific intent to commit the underlying offense. The
courts have employed the mens rea of knowledge to prove intent in
these troubling cases.
Let us return to our initial discussion of a merchant who supplied goods or services that provided essential aid to the purchaser's
crime. The formulation of any rule affecting the potential criminal
liability of a merchant must be tempered by factual and legal distinctions. Such distinctions are illustrated in the case of United States v.
Falcone.7 In that case, the court found that mere knowledge of the
use of the product, without additional facts, would not be sufficient
to impose liability on the seller of yeast. 77 As Justice Hand stated:
"It is not enough that [a seller] does not forego a normally lawful
activity, of the fruits of which he knows that others will make an
unlawful use; he must in some sense promote their venture himself,
' '78
make it his own, have a stake in its outcome.
The courts tread cautiously in approaching those factors that,
when combined with knowledge, would create liability for the supplier. In Direct Sales v. United States,79 the United States Supreme
Court clarified the position of Falcone and found that the type of
activity in which the drug manufacturer was involved created "suffi74. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949); Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640 (1946); Commonwealth v. Perry, 357 Mass. 149, 256 N.E.2d 745 (1970).
75. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART (2d ed. 1961).
76. 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1940) affd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940). For a contrary result, see
People v. Samarjian, 240 Cal. App. 2d 13, 49 Cal. Rptr. 180 (1966), where the court held that
defendant, convicted of conspiracy to commit forgery, did not demonstrate that he had conspired with the ticket passers nor that he knew that the passers were conspiring with each
other.
77. Important to that court's ruling was the fact that defendant seller had supplied a
legal commodity, yeast, and therefore without any additional facts of intent to partake in the
venture, there was no conspiracy. Earlier cases did not follow this analysis. In Vukich v.
United States, 28 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1928), the court affirmed the conviction of a supplier of
goods for a distillery, concluding that the business could not be carried on without supplies.
Similarly, in Borgia v. United States, 78 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1935), the court was less concerned that the commodities sold to the distillery maker were legal and more concerned with
whether defendant knew or should have known the purpose for which the purchasers were
taking the goods.
78. United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940).
79. 319 U.S. 703 (1943).
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cient additional facts" to find a conspiracy. The evidence indicated
that the drug manufacturer knew of the illegal purpose for which the
physician was ordering the morphine and that the vast quantities
sold to the doctor should have put the manufacturer on notice that
the doctor was not dispensing the drugs legally.8"
In addition to knowledge, however, the Court in Direct Sales
found the element necessary for conviction which was missing in
Falcone-the defendant "intend[ed] to further, promote and cooperate in [the criminal venture]." 81 Direct Sales was convicted of conspiracy because it had reaped benefits over and above those normal
to the mail order business as a result of the doctor's illegal activity.
The Supreme Court did not base the conspiracy, therefore, on the
knowledge of Direct Sales, but rather on the intent to conspire that
was implied from the ongoing relationship between the physician
and the drug company. While the Court noted the inherent danger
of "piling inference upon inference"8 2 to arrive at the determination
of the mens rea, it nonetheless concluded that these facts warranted
the making of the required inference.
Direct Sales offers a valuable comparison to aiding and abetting
cases. Significantly, what "additional factors" are necessary to establish the intent to aid and abet as set out in the Beeman decision?
The Beeman court, in dicta, mentioned that knowledge of the probable consequences coupled with volitional acts may raise the inference
of intent.83 The difficulty in that statement, however, lies with the
term "volitional acts" which only seems to require acts that are intended and not done negligently. Acts that are intentional may be
done without any purpose of encouraging the commission of the
crime, as the Beeman opinion noted.84 The opinion, however, fails to
demarcate the kind of volitional act that coupled with knowledge
would create an inference of intent.
Two methods of analysis are suggested as possibilities for determining the liability of an aider and abettor. One theory was used by
the Falcone-DirectSales line of cases. Under this method, if there is
no direct evidence of intent, the critical focus seems to be whether the
80. The doctor ordered morphine sulphate tablets in the quantity of 79,000 half-grain
tablets from the period of November, 1937 to January, 1940. By contrast, the average physician ordered no more than 400 quarter-grain tablets annually. Id. at 706.
81. Id. at 711.
82. Id. The court of appeals in People v. Yarber, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 911, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 883-84 expressed the same concern with respect to the aider and abettor jury instruction before it.
83. 35 Cal. 3d at 560, 674 P.2d at 1326, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
84. Id.
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actor has demonstrated purposive conduct to participate in the illegal activity. Measuring intent by purposive conduct, rather than by
merely looking at whether the act committed was voluntary, ensures
that an actor will not be held liable if his conduct does not imply the
intent to participate.
Consider, for example, United States v. Cadena,86 in which the
court, by attempting to follow the dictates of Direct Sales, held crew
members on board a ship chargeable with conspiracy to transport
marijuana because they had knowledge of the existence of the drug
on board. In so holding, the court merely found the knowledge of the
crew members and from this raised the inference of their intent to
conspire. While they may have committed volitional acts, there is no
evidence that the crew members engaged in the type of purposive
conduct that would imply their intent to conspire. The dissent distinguished the crew members' actions from those of the drug company
in Direct Sales, arguing that the crew members may have promoted
the objective of transporting the marijuana, but that unless they realized that they were involved in a conspiracy, and so intended, they
should not be held liable.86
If purposive conduct were the standard, the focus of inquiry
might rest on the nature of the crime committed by the perpetrator.
Factors to be considered by the court might include the seriousness of
the crime contemplated and whether the commodity sold was of an
illegal nature. The relevance of the legality of the commodity sold
was advanced in Direct Sales in which the Court found that the sale
of an illegal good "makes a difference in the quantity of proof required to show knowledge that the buyer will utilize the article unlawfully. .

.

.So far as knowledge is the foundation of intent, the

latter thereby also becomes the more secure."8
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Direct Sales, the issue
ultimately revolves around the quantum of proof of intent for secondary party liability. The court of appeals in Cadena placed unwarranted reliance on the knowledge of the crew members and failed
to consider additional factors which could have provided more reliable evidence of whether their conduct was intended to be criminal.
While the Direct Sales line of cases focused on the purposive
85. 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978).
86. Id. at 1267.
87. United States v. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 711-12. See also United States v.
Michelena-Orovio, 702 F.2d 496, 505 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Burchinal, 657 F.2d
985, 990-91 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rush, 666 F.2d 10, 11-12 (2d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Alvarez, 610 F.2d 1250, 1256 (5th Cir. 1980).
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conduct of the actor, another possible analysis was explored in People v. Lauria.8 8 The facts revealed that Lauria, who owned an answering service, knew that several of his customers were prostitutes
and that, despite this knowledge, he continued to offer them the answering service which, of course, promoted their unlawful activity.
Lauria's knowledge of their illegal activities would not, alone, create
liability. Thus, the trial court followed the approach in Direct Sales
and concluded that none of the Direct Sales criteria existed.89
The court of appeals took the analysis one step farther
though-it analyzed the nature of the offense charged. It reasoned
that Lauria's conviction for a misdemeanor could not be supported
by the same factual inference as a conviction for a felony. The court
did not believe that "an inference of intent drawn from knowledge of
criminal use properly applies to the less serious crimes classified as
misdemeanors." 90
Although it may appear that the court's distinction between felony and misdemeanor crimes is irrelevant, it actually raises a significant consideration. The argument can be made that a party who has
knowledge of the imminent commission of a serious crime would be
more inclined to refuse to assist in the completion of it. A serious
crime carries with it consequences that a secondary party would not
be willing to undertake unless he had the "shared criminal intent" of
the perpetrator.
In the case of a misdemeanor, such as prostitution, a party not
wishing to share in the enterprise might not loudly protest its commission given the nature of the crime. The same party seeing a serious crime committed might arguably react differently. The Lauria
analysis refused to imply from his silence that Lauria intended to
conspire with the prostitutes.
The Beeman court reemphasized the importance of knowledge
in assessing culpability regardless of the method of analysis used.91
88. 25i Cal. App. 2d 471, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1967).
89. For example, the volume of business the seller is given provides the incentive for
continued cooperation. Unlike Direct Sales, the facts of Lauria offered no such obvious increase in volume or profits over the services of other customers.
90. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 481, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 634. The court did not embrace in the
Lauria opinion the converse of that rule-that knowledge of the commission of a felony would
imply the intent to assist. One commentator questioned this line of analysis when he asked,
"Why can a fact finder infer intent if the object crime is a felony, but cannot if the crime is a
misdemeanor? The distinction is difficult to understand. The nature of the defendant's conduct
and state of mind rather than the category of the ultimate or object crime should determine if a
court may infer intent." Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy: The State of Mind Crime-Intent,
Proving Intent, and Anti-Federal Intent, U. OF ILL. L.F. 627, 643-44 (1976).
91. 35 Cal. 3d at 560, 674 P.2d at 1325-26, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 67-68.
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To encourage schematic uniformity between conspiracy and complicity, it is urged that in the aftermath of Beeman the courts look to the
analyses of conspiracy cases for guidance. As the next section will
present, another avenue for consideration, apart from knowledge as
the foundation for intent to aid and abet, is the use of knowledge as
the basis for culpability under a separate criminal facilitation statute.

IV.

FILLING THE GAP: THE NEED FOR

A

CRIMINAL FACILITA-

TION STATUTE

When the California Supreme Court clarified the mens rea of
aiding and abetting in People v. Beeman,9" it effectively reduced the
number of potential actors chargeable as accomplices. If intent is
necessary to a conviction for aiding and abetting, then actors who
have demonstrated less than purposeful aid cannot be punished for
the commission of a crime, even though they may have engaged in
facilitous actions. If these actors lack the Beeman concept of shared
criminal intent, 98 it is questionable that they should incur no criminal liability for their knowing assistance which may have been in94
strumental to the success of the crime.
This issue is explored through a reexamination of the Beeman
facts. While the prosecution presented considerable incriminating evidence against Beeman,95 assume that on remand the jury believes
that Beeman did not share the criminal intent of the robbers.9"
Beeman's acquittal would necessarily follow from such a finding;
yet, he had done everything from drawing the floor plan to dressing
97
one of the robbers.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 557-58, 674 P.2d at 1323-1324, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 65-68; see also supra notes
58-62.
94. Whether particular conduct should be punished is a central question in criminal
law. For an excellent discussion, see Robinson, A Theory of Justification:Social Harm As A
Prerequisitefor Criminal Liability, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 266 (1975); Packer, Making the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (1964).
95. As the appellate court noted, Beeman "raised the subject of the robbery with his
cohorts, discussed the method by which it could be committed, informed them of the riches
which could easily be taken, gave them the address of the home of the victim, described the
intended victim's car, drew a floor plan of the house, and agreed to sell the stolen items for a
share in the proceeds." 179 Cal. Rptr. 100, 107-08 (Cal. App. 1981) (opinion omitted on
direction of the supreme court by order dated Feb. 10, 1982).
96. This assumption may not be altogether specious. After all, at Beeman's first trial,
the jury had sought further instructions on accomplice liability indicating that it had not rejected outright Beeman's testimony. 35 Cal. 3d at 562, 674 P.2d at 1327, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
97. The evidence indicated that Beeman loaned one of the robbers a suit telling him: "If
you are going to do a robbery, you can't look like a bum." 179 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
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The Beeman facts illustrate the gap that has been created by
the exclusion of knowing assistance as the mens rea in accomplice
liability. A legislative remedy that would shore the gap and redress
the wrongs committed by these actors, which go unpunished under
present complicity law, would be the enactment of a criminal facilitation statute.98 Such a statute would characterize as a separate offense the knowing assistance of a crime without having to resort to
traditional notions of complicity or conspiracy to achieve the result.
New York's facilitation statute99 provides an example:
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation in the second degree
when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person
who intends to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which
provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a
felony. 00
The statute was designed to address accessorial conduct that, although unintentional, does aid in the commission of a felony. According to the provisions of the statute, the facilitator would be punished under the classification which also provides its own sentencing
provisions.1
A statute, similar to the one pioneered in New York, would
address conduct that has been unsuccessfully treated under accomplice liability.'0 Knowing assistance would provide the mens rea for
accountability under such a provision, and because intent is not a
prerequisite, those actors who furnish assistance with knowledge of
the perpetrator's intent would be convicted.'0°
98. For a general discussion, see W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW, § 64 at 507-09 (1972). To date, Arizona has followed the precedent established by New
York. See AiUz. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 13-1004.

99. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.05 (McKinney 1978) (the statute was part of a comprehensive revision of the Code's statement on party liability). See Sobel, The Anticipatory Offenses
in the New York Penal Law: Solicitation, Conspiracy, Attempt and Facilitation,32 BROOKLYN L. REV. 257 (1966).

100. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115.05 (McKinney 1978). The provision does not provide for
liability in facilitating a misdemeanor. Also note that the original language of N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 115.05 required that the facilitator actually knew that the perpetrator was going to
commit the crime. This language was changed to the present standard of "believing it probable." See also Note, The Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 COL. L. REV. 1469, 1523-24
(1964). New York's provision is similar to a draft of criminal facilitation that was rejected by
The American Law Institute. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b), comment (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1953).
101. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 11505 (McKinney 1978).
102. See supra note 1.
103. The enactment of a criminal facilitation statute in California has been contemplated. Shortly after New York adopted its statute, a proposed change to the California Penal
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Currently, several activities continue to be treated within accomplice liability parameters, but because of logical flaws that permeate the analysis, these activities would be better routed under a
separate crime of facilitation. The analytical difficulties in the use of
foreseeability to convict an accomplice of a specific intent crime and
in the treatment of the supplier, will be examined under a facilitation model.
A.

The Specific Intent Crime

Sometimes an actor is held responsible for a crime that was not
intended, but was deemed to be the natural and probable consequence of an initial wrongdoing.1 °4 Any culpability for that unintended, but foreseeable, crime stems from the risk presumed in the
undertaking.' 0 5 Illustrative of this point is the felony-murder doctrine which holds felons liable for deaths that result from dangerous
felonies, generally proscribed by statute.' 0 6
The difficulty in using the foreseeability test in accomplice liability results from employing a negligence-based standard for the
secondary party's guilt, but retaining the underlying requirement of
specific intent for the perpetrator. To complicate the situation further, courts have used the natural and probable consequences test
when the initial activity triggering complicity may be as innocuous
Code was circulated. The draft included the following: "A person is guilty of criminal facilitation when, knowing another person intends to engage in conduct which in fact constitutes an
offense, he knowingly furnishes substantial assistance to him." Penal Code Revision Project,
Tent. Draft No. 2 (1968). See Comment, A New Crime: Criminal Facilitation, 18 Loy. L.
REV. 103 (1971) which advances the position that the crime of facilitation is unwarranted.
104. Some states have codified this position. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205(a) (1970);
MINN. STAT. ANN § 609.05 (West Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.05 (West 1982). For
a discussion of this area, see Sayer, CriminalResponsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV.
L. REV. 689, 702-06 (1930). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 204 (presently § .06) (Tent.
Draft No. 1. 1953) in which the drafters foresaw the dangers in such a doctrine: "It is submitted that the liability of an accomplice ought not to extend beyond the criminal purposes that he
shares or knows."
105. See State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S.W.2d 1049 (1932) (court held defendant
guilty of murder because it was foreseeable that a fireman would be killed in the arson that
defendant set); see also People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909
(1965), rev'd on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); People v. Thomas, 41 Cal. 2d 470, 260
P.2d 1 (1953); People v. Manriquez, 188 Cal. 602, 206 P. 63 (1922).
106. This rule has been the subject of considerable debate in cases in which defendant
did not do the killing. See Pizano v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 128, 577 P.2d 659, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 524 (1978); People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 539 P.2d 43, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1975);
People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965); Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958). For further discussion, see Note, The
CaliforniaSupreme Court Assaults the Felony-Murder Rule, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1970);
Comment, California Rewrites Felony Murder Rule, 18 STAN. L. REV. 690 (1966).
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as the voluntary association with a gang. Problems arise therefore on
two separate fronts: (1) whether the initial wrongdoing is sufficiently
criminal to trigger the foreseeability test, and (2) whether the foreseeability test may be used successfully in a specific intent crime.
Whether an accomplice may assert an affirmative defense to negate the specific intent of the underlying crime was explored in People v. Vasquez.107 Because defendant was charged as an accomplice
to an assault with intent to commit murder,"0 8 the court recognized
that defendant's position as an aider and abettor did not preclude an
affirmative defense of intoxication to negate the specific intent in
assault."10

The Vasquez assertion that an underlying specific intent may be
negated-in this case by intoxication-must be examined in its
broader context. The controlling factor in Vasquez was that defendant had been charged with assault, leading to the conclusion that
the court sanctioned the defense of intoxication because assault required specific intent. 10 In so doing, the court placed the accomplice
on equal footing with the perpetrator in allowing him to negate a
specific intent if required to be proved.
What is often seen, however, is that because the accomplice assumes the risk of the commission of foreseeable crimes committed by
the perpetrator, his specific intent is not required. The perpetrator's
specific intent is imputed to the aider and abettor through the foreseeability test, raising the question of whether an affirmative defense
may be asserted in this situation. 1'
This conflict between fulfilling the requisite specific intent and
107.
108.

29 Cal. App. 3d 81, 105 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1972).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 217 (West 1970) repealed by Stats. 1980, c. 300, p. 628, §§
1, 2 (West Supp. 1984).
109. The court allowed the use of diminished capacity through intoxication by resorting
to then Cal. Penal Code § 22 which stated:
No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less
criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element
to constitute any . . . crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that
the accused was intoxicated . . . in determining the purpose, motive or intent.
29 Cal. App. 3d at 87-88 n.6, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 184 n.6.
110. For support that assault is a specific intent crime, see People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d
444, 462 P.2d 870, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969); People v. Nance, 25 Cal. App. 3d 925, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 266 (1972); People v. Glover, 257 Cal. App. 2d 502, 65 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1967).
111. The problem described does not arise in a conspiracy context as it does in aiding
and abetting because conspiracy requires the specific intent to commit a crime. See People v.
Horn, 12 Cal. 3d 290, 524 P.2d 1300, 115 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1974). The co-conspirator, unlike
the accomplice would have the opportunity to present an affirmative defense to negate the
specific intent requirement at the conspiracy level.
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the desire to create culpability for foreseeable consequences is illustrated by People v. Montano.112 Montano was convicted of aiding
and abetting the attempted murder of a fifteen-year-old from a rival
gang. His defense was that, at most, he had anticipated that his
friends would beat up the boy, but because he had not known that
they were armed, he could not have contemplated that they would
shoot the boy. To substantiate his claim, Montano testified that he
stayed in the car while his two friends took the boy up into a secluded mountain spot; he believed that his friends would, at most,
beat the youth."'
The Montano appellate court was faced with an accomplice
who repudiated any specific intent to kill, but who, nonetheless, was
convicted of the crime of attempted murder which requires the specific intent to kill."" Two reasons may be offered to justify the conviction: the trial court may have concluded that the evidence demonstrated that Montano harbored the specific intent to kill,"' or
alternatively, that although Montano had not entertained the specific
intent, the death of the rival gang member may not have been an
"unreasonable result to be expected."" ' 6
The appellate court affirmed the conviction using the natural
and probable consequences test. The court found that the frequency
of gang attacks and the resultant homicides in general could have
been anticipated by the gang members. Under this reasoning, the
conviction for aiding and abetting did not rest on Montano's knowledge that his friends were armed on that occasion, nor on his awareness that they intended to kill the victim." 7
The use of this analysis in accomplice liability is a serious misapplication. The natural and probable consequence test may be used
112. 96 Cal. App. 3d 221, 158 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1979).
113. Id. at 224, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
114. His conviction was for a violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 217 (West 1970), assault with intent to commit murder, which is a form of attempted murder.
115. There is some confusion on this point. The judge made several comments at the
conclusion of the trial and at sentencing to indicate that there may have been some doubt as to
Montano's knowledge of the plans. See People v. Montano, 96 Cal. App. 3d at 227 n.2, 158
Cal. Rptr. at 50 n.2 (the appellate court quoted the trial court as saying "he could not say
'beyond a reasonable doubt' that Montano saw 'the placing of the gun in the small of the back
[ofthe victim)").
116. Id. at 227, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (quoting People v. Martinez, 239 Cal. App. 2d
161, 48 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1966)).
117. Id. For a contrary result, see People v. McChristian, 18 Ill.
App. 3d 87, 309 N.E.
2d 388 (1974) in which the court refused to use the natural and probable consequences test
where the specific intent crime of conspiracy to commit murder was charged. Also see People v.
Bailey, 60 Il1. 2d 37, 322 N.E. 2d 804 (1975).
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successfully in crimes that can be met through recklessness,1 1 but it
strains viability to resort to its use in specific intent crimes. In this
case, Montano was convicted of the specific intent crime of attempted
murder, without the specific intent to kill, and without the shared
criminal intent of the perpetrators.1 1 9
One can see the inconsistency by comparing the accomplice's
conduct with the perpetrator's conduct. In Montano, the perpetrator
would not be convicted of attempted murder if it could be proved, for
instance, that his gun had misfired and injured the victim. The
charge would fail for want of the prima facie element of the specific
intent to kill.120 The perpetrator's involvement with a gang would
not, in and of itself, satisfy the mens rea if it could be shown that he
did not entertain the specific intent to kill. Montano, on the other
hand, charged with the same crime as an aider and abettor, could be
convicted without a showing of specific intent.
This criticism is not meant to advocate that Montano should
have remained beyond the reach of the criminal law, but rather to
suggest that accomplice liability may not provide the best tool for
redressing his conduct. It is true that he helped lure the unsuspecting
victim into the car, that he knew and intended that the victim be
roughed up, 2 ' and therefore his actions should have penal consequences. But, it is a misapplication to use the accomplice theory to
determine his culpability. A better route to travel in such a case
would be the employment of a criminal facilitation statute. The
court, therefore, would not need to undergo the awkward pretense of
creating specific intent where none exists, and the natural and probable consequences test would be left to the appropriate cases involving reckless conduct.
Under a criminal facilitation statute, Montano would be convicted because the thrust of any such provision is to deter knowing
assistance which foreseeably causes or promotes the commission of a
crime. In light of this, Montano would be punished for his involvement in trapping the youth. His assistance, coupled with the foresee118. See supra note 106.
119. See People v. Vasquez, 29 Cal. App. 3d 81, 105 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1972) (the court
recognized the difference in charge between a general and specific intent crime). In Vasquez,
the court allowed the use of the defense of intoxication by the aider and abettor to negate the
specific intent crime of assault. See also supra note 109 and accompanying text.

120. See generally W.

LAFAVE

& A. ScoTr,

HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW

§ 59

(1972). See also Merritt v. Commonwealth, 180 S.E. 395 (1935); Thacker v. Commonwealth,
134 Va. 767, 114 S.E. 504 (1922). For a discussion regarding the inference of intent from
surrounding circumstances, see State v. Starkey, 244 S.E.2d 219 (1978).
121. 96 Cal. App. 3d at 224, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
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ability that the youth would be seriously injured, would make him
criminally liable for the shooting that resulted. Montano's liability
would not hinge, however, on the creativity of the court and its ability to impute the perpetrator's specific intent to him.
B.

The Supplier

As already noted, the accountability of the supplier of goods or
services has caused the courts considerable difficulties. Because juris122
dictions treat the aider and abettor as a principal to the crime,
courts appear reluctant to uphold convictions for complicity if the
12
supplier has not demonstrated a stake in the venture. 1
For example, whether the conduct exhibited by the supplier is
deemed sufficiently dangerous to warrant criminal prosecution may
depend upon the gravity of the crime charged and the potential sentence.1 24 In People v. Lauria,2 5 defendant admitted that he knew
that a percentage of his clients using his answering service were
prostitutes.1 26 The court, caught between the conflicting principles of
controlling prostitution on the one hand, and allowing Lauria to conduct his lawful business without interference on the other, opted to
exonerate Lauria.
Did the court believe that Lauria had committed no societal
wrong when he knowingly furnished assistance to prostitutes, or did
the court, instead, conclude that any wrong committed by Lauria
was not sufficiently severe to constitute aiding and abetting? The
type of conduct exhibited by Lauria would be reached by the enactment of a criminal facilitation statute with its separate sentencing
provision.1 27 The court would be free to examine the supplier's conduct without the burden of applying the harsher aiding and abetting
sentence provision.
By employing the crime of facilitation, therefore, the court could
122. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.05 (West 1979), MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04.
123. This standard was derived from United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.
1940), affd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940), in which the court held that conviction requires that defendant promote the venture and have a stake in the outcome.
124. As was seen in the decisions of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) and
Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983), the courts
were concerned with the gravity of the sentence-the death penalty-if defendant's conduct
may not have warranted such a serious punishment. Although based on the eighth amendment,
that analysis follows through to these cases. See also supra note 4.
125. 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1967).
126. Id. at 475-76, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
127. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE § 115.05 (McKinney 1978). It provides that criminal
facilitation is a misdemeanor unless the object crime is murder or kidnapping.
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view the supplier in the proper context, not as a principal to the
crime of prostitution which would necessitate a showing of Lauria's
stake in the venture."2 8 Instead, the court could focus upon Lauria's
knowing facilitation of the crime, which Lauria should not be able to
defend merely by claiming that he made no added profits. His culpability stems from the societal wrong in encouraging the commission
of an unlawful activity, whether or not that encouragement takes the
larger form of aiding and abetting the prostitute. Even though it is
opposed by society, the conduct typified by Lauria is beyond the
reach of the criminal law unless the crime of facilitation is employed.
V.

CONCLUSION

Accomplice liability constitutes a vital component in criminal
law. The reinjectment of intent into the requirement for culpability
is but a first step to a broader-based and more cohesive use of party
liability. Discarding knowing assistance as the mens rea for the aider
and abettor is legally sound, but it exacts a social cost in the process.
In the aftermath of Beeman, conduct that was previously punishable must be rerouted so that the policy of deterrence may continue. The proposal advanced would be the criminal facilitation statute to shore the gap and assist in creating a far reaching and more
effective tool in party liability.

128. In the course of the business, it would be difficult to prove a "stake in the venture"
since Lauria did not charge the prostitutes more than other clients nor is there evidence to
suggest that he received a percentage of the fee collected by his clients.

